

Revisiting Leadership within the United States Marine Corps:

An Informational View of Marine Corps Leadership

Dathan Byrd

United States Marine Corps

Abstract: Throughout the last decade, the United States Marine Corps has required leaders who are more morally equipped and educated than any time in history. As a consequence, current Marines must deal with environments that go beyond the scope of the gun and mortar. Marines are being asked to fight with the rifle in one hand while carrying foreign diplomacy on their sleeves by way of the United States Flag insignia or under the guise of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) patch. The leadership challenges that face current and future Marines is daunting. The ideology of an orderly and decisive war perished in the streets of Iraq and atop the mountains of Afghanistan. Marines today face a six-dimensional threat. The first four dimensions of war have some similarities and familiar structures (land, sea, air, and aerospace). All four dimensions are based on kinetic energy, that is, they fundamentally destroy assets – in the form of people or infrastructure and all are either state owned or state controllable. Even sophisticated non-state players like Daesh have not managed meaningful capability in sea, air or space. However, the fifth and sixth dimensions of cyberspace and mind manipulation must account for the way Marine leaders are educated and prepared to lead. This informational paper is to shed light on the leadership challenges currently facing U.S. Marines and to reinforce the debate on what it means to be a great Marine leader.

Keywords: Leadership; Military; Dynamic; Asymmetrical; Conflict

I Introduction

It has been 18 years since former Marine Commandant General Charles Krulak, conceived the term “Three Block War” (Krulak, 1999). The Three Block War is a fictitious story of Corporal Hernandez and the Marines of 2nd Platoon, Lima Company. Operating thousands of miles from the center of Marine Corps leadership, Marines are expected to display a high level of cognitive acuity to leadership and military bearing that embodies what it means to be a United States Marine. Successes of such a demanding position under severe conditions require an unwavering maturity, unparalleled decision-making abilities, and intestinal fortitude.

In the current period of 24-hour media and frontline reporting, every decision a Marine makes may be tried in the press and by the opinions of social media. General Krulak, “In many cases, the individual Marine [leader] will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation but the operational and strategic levels as well” (Krulak, 1999; Liddy, 2002). As the politicization of the U.S. military increases so too does leadership amongst Marines. As indispensable as the U.S. Marine Corps is for the preservation of democracy and to U.S. foreign diplomacy, it is critical to redefine and re-educate Marines on effective military leadership.

II The Marine Corps Leadership

Leadership, “The process by which an agent prompts a subordinate to behave in a desired manner” (Bennis, 1959) or “The process of influencing an organized group towards accomplishing its goals” (Behling & Roach, 1984). Although few Marines can independently agree on what makes a good, if not great, Marine leader. All will agree that the foundation for their success as leaders originates from the Marine Corps leadership traits and principles (Dye, 2011). Found in any locker room or collegiate ethics binder - dedication, initiative, selflessness, and integrity - are qualities apparent to even the casual observer. However, some not-so-obvious like *tact*, define the way Marines think twice before making decisions of professional courtesy.

Marine Corps leadership is not a catch phrase or a gimmick. The Marine Corps is held together by the authority of its leaders and where its structures and procedures are only useful if individual subordinate Marines give faith to that system. Highly motivated and well-trained individuals provide the only guarantee that the Marines are capable of such, almost, blind following from its members.

There are numerous approaches to leadership and proponents of each proclaim his or her “style” more effective over the rest; Piaget, Friedman, Skinner, Barge and Fairhurst, and Marine Corps leaders themselves. However, a Marine must exercise an adaptable leadership predisposition in accordance with the situation in which he or she finds himself or herself. Leadership in warfare is not that complicated nor is it suggested to be easy; however, it is deceptively simple (Swain, 1973). Marine leaders receive numerous hours of instruction on threat-focused decision-making, initiative-based training, acclimatization, responsive and adjustment procedures, and counteroffensive and defensive techniques (Cojocar, 2011).

Piaget’s (Flavel, 1999) cognitive theory explaining the process of child developmental as a form of adaptation resulting from biological maturation and environmental experience is a learning concept for Marines. The ability to understand an environment is based on how the individual interprets their reality created by previous experiences. However, if there are no skills to scaffold from, the Marine Corps adopts objectivism to replace constructivism.

The Corps' training and education objectives assume newer Marines understand their role is to learn, while it is the job of the educated, more senior Marines, to teach them. Education for these Marines is to learn only the objective truth of their environment as taught to them by their leaders. Individual decision-making about the environment is stripped away and replaced with strict objectivism. Nevertheless, to ensure the end-state of creating effective Marine leaders, shaping is also commonplace.

Shaping correlates directly to the procedural reinforcement of a progressive sequence of subtle behavioral modifications toward a particular conduct, beginning with the initial molding of a civilian to a Marine in boot camp. The implementation of Marine Corps leadership shaping procedures requires; however, an opposite approach to Friedman who discusses shaping as a subtle, natural variation in the way actions are performed (Friedman, 2009). The Marine Corps shapes its required behaviors forcefully and aggressively.

B.F. Skinner's 'operant conditioning' believes that there should be a focus on the observable origins to behavior as an alternative to rationalizing the internal cognitive beliefs of individuals (McLeod, 2009). However, a difference between Skinner's 'operant conditioning' and 'classical conditioning' when referencing Marine Corps leadership is that leadership in the Marine Corps does not look for a voluntary response that may be followed by a reinforcing stimulus. In contrast, Marine leaders look to classical conditioning when a stimulus automatically triggers an involuntary response (e.g., using rifle range targets that look like humans, dehumanizing the enemy) (The Basic School, 2013). Thus, the Corps's ethos of *loyalty* and *instant willingness obedience to orders* go against conventional and contemporary theories of individual changes in behavior.

In metacognition, *thinking about thinking* (Bartlett, Burley, Dixon, Gannon, Knarr, & Schatz, 2012), though widely acceptable in civilian society, is a danger to the good order and discipline of the Corps. Marines are led through a push-pull method with little room for subjective interpretation. However, after over a decade and a half of asymmetrical conflicts, the Corps' is beginning to identify trends of newer Marines who are joining with a greater sense of self-awareness, self-assuredness, and with an advanced comprehension of metacognition. Therein lays the next evolution of Marine Corps leadership; *leadership*, the experience of leaders, becoming cognitively self-aware through systematic thinking (Priopae-Serbanescu, 2012).

III Requirements of Good Leadership

Ar-Rutbah, Rawa, H t, and Baghdadi were battles fought by U.S. Marines throughout the second Gulf War. Over ten years later, the names of these cities are fading and carelessly so too are the leadership lessons learned. The most incredulous mistake leaders from these battles could make, are to let time lapse experience and be replaced with SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) written after the fact.

Decision-making in leadership as a researchable and teachable subject area can be viewed with mixed success. At worst, research in leadership and instruction can be a tedious labyrinth of inconsistent definitions and misdirected findings. Although some leadership theorists may separate the definitions of leadership and decision-making (Carson & King, 2005), others offer a solution to the state of molasses that has become leadership within the Marine Corps. Carson & King (2005) proposed a solution to separate, via empowerment, recognized leadership practices

and definitions from the vague institutional [Marine Corps] constructs of leadership and decision-making, as they may be traditionally defined, and into constructs with much more effectiveness and functionality. One such construct is that of empowerment.

The emergence of numerous threats has added a complexity to war, the multiplicity of individuals involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of armed conflict (Cojocar, 2011). Insurgent and extremist strategies, the frequency of unstable conflicts, difficulty within a socio-developmental region, and importance on decentralizing operations have created leadership and decision-making challenges amongst leaders. If unit leaders are not empowered to make decisions within an asymmetrical battle space, they will become predisposed to delay their actions while waiting for orders and information (Gehler, 2005).

Dispersed operations, adaptive adversaries, rules of engagement, and mission diversity have shown gaps in training, technology procurement and implementation, and personnel management within the Marine Corps. These environmental contexts should be researched as possible causes for paralysis of battlefield leadership. In the meantime, senior leaders should begin adapting to the asymmetrical warfare by understanding the depth and complexity of challenges facing small unit leaders and educating them on individual and collective subjects (e.g. media relations, cultural awareness, and the human element of war fighting) (Liddy, 2002).

Also, the Marine Corps must begin to study the archetypical characteristics of men and women currently joining the Corps. retired Marine veteran recently commented on how Marines of current engagements and those of the Vietnam War think about conflicts and the profession of being Marines.

Marines embrace the warrior archetype more than other branches. The shadow of this is patriarchy, misogyny, and brutality. We are trained to be killing machines, deadening all emotion except anger. We're told we don't have the luxury of sensitivity, so we objectify everything (Russ, 2017) (as cited by Parker, 2017).

In contrast to criticism of the visibly out-of-date thinking about being a Marine in today's society. Servicemembers complaints of a structure too rigid for career advancement at some military institutions, such as West Point, have accelerated military changes from the Department Defense. Who, currently plan to restructure the system for promotion and agree to a more flexible recruiting structure for officer allocations and promotions (Lilley, 2016).

With half of the current U.S. Marine Corps active force from the millennial generation (Lilley, 2016). The Corps' ability to create effective leaders must start at understanding those who look to join in a period that may not conveniently fit into the ethos and characterized demands of the Corps' "Old Guard."

The complex and hybrid environments, e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to the resourcefulness of newer, generational, leaders in unconventional battle situations (National Research Council, 2012). Imaginative in creating on-the-spot strategies to lessen the effects of resource gaps. The current small unit leader is encouraging higher echelon leaders to look to their experience as informed decision makers specifically, in asymmetrical leadership situations. The unit leader uses his or her decision-making to influence senior leaders and to inspire junior subordinates.

The United States Army has released its Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process* that characterizes the attitude shift to developing flexible leaders in design making. The intent is to educate leaders who can unconventionally think and can recognize the complexity of a

problem before seeking its solution (Cojocar, 2011). Understanding complex problems within an assumed context will allow leaders to cognitively take part in the visualization, understanding, decision, and direction phases of the unit leader responsibilities.

To this end, Rothwell (2010) investigated leadership readiness versus the potential for leadership to differentiate between individuals with future leadership potential and those ready to lead. This interpretation of the formulation of one's ability or potential to lead is also dependent on supporting dynamics, such as the genetics of nature in preparing a leader for the refinement of the nurturing process. To capitalize on the leadership readiness, the Marine Corps' Training and Education Command (TECOM) has established the Small Unit Decision Making (SUDM) (Brown, et al., 2012) program that focuses on the leader's cognitive capacity for sense making, adaptability, problem-solving, metacognition, and attention control. The initiative will improve the skill level of small unit leaders across the Marine Air Ground Task Force MAGTF and prepare leaders with the abilities to evaluate, determine, and perform while deployed in a dispersed environment (Brown, et al., 2012). Training and Education Command administrators are converting instructional procedures into tangible forms (e.g., prepared handbooks and instructor development discussions).

Collins (2001), famously stated, "Leaders of companies that go from good to great start not with 'where' but with 'who.' They start by getting the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats. They stick with that discipline—first the people, then the direction—no matter how dire the circumstances." The SUDM initiative is, superficially, the Marine Corps' "bus" of creating and keeping great leaders.

IV Characteristics of Leadership

Michael Maccoby (1981) (as cited in Clawson, 2006) approached leadership with what he saw was the four character traits of leadership: *craft*, *enterprise*, *career*, and *self*. Within each trait, Maccoby found that a leader's role orientation carried positive and negative effects. First, a leader's craft positively reflects his or her as traditionally oriented to independent thinking, hardworking, and skilled. Alternatively, the negative display of the craft trait shows his or her propensity to become inflexible and suspicious. This suspicion has become expectedly pervasive throughout the military between lower Marines and senior leaders.

A survey conducted by the U.S. Army found that participants believed destructive leaders are focused on visible short-term mission objectives and are indifferent about, or ignorant to, troop morale. The majority of subordinates see this current craft style of leadership as arrogant, self-serving, and inflexible. Military leaders are in a unique position to be close to their subordinates, and yet they may be the last to detect their flawed crafted behavior (Reed, 2004).

Second, the enterprising leader displays positive characteristics of daring and entrepreneurial prowess toward their work and organization, whereas negatively he or she can be instrumental, calculating, and uncaring. The Marine Corps holds Marines to a high standard of professional and personal conduct. However, because of previous combat incidents involving Marines, this conduct has become the target of criticism by Marine insiders and detractors alike.

Third, Maccoby discusses how positively the career trait of a leader can reflect the professional and meritocratic life of a person. On the other hand, it can negatively subjugate a leader to bureaucracy and fearfulness. Whether it is faithfulness to the organization or fear of retaliation from senior leaders, most of what happens within an organizational [leadership] career

are unknown to the public (Sun, 2009). It has not been lost in writing this paper how many reports of toxic leadership have come from the U.S. Army and not the Marine Corps; therefore, casting doubt if the Corps, is in fact, having a leadership crisis. However, this very veil of secret internal discrimination and intimidation lends to Maccoby's justification of why the career trait is important.

Finally, self is a leadership characteristic that when positively identified with can propel a leader to become experimental and self-developing. However, when negatively associated with it can impede a leader into escapist roles and rebellious behaviors. Most recently, the Corps has navigated through accusations of senior leaders scape goating juniors for monumental issues that they too were a part of in their lack of understanding leadership control within the Marines. A notable case, a former senior commander of the Corps stating his office would, "crush...the Marines responsible" (deGrandpre, 2015).

V Leadership Realignment

Leadership is about coping with change that begins with establishing a direction and aligning individuals to a successful outcome. The successful development of an organization's strategy depends on the growth and maturity of its leaders at all levels. Leaders must be able to balance the demanding requirements of the organization while providing for subordinates (McCausland, 2008).

Although there are numerous civilian and military articles, publications, and books on leadership. The United States Marine Corps continues to develop modern leadership theories and practices. Leadership and individual actions are what separate leaders and followers in the Marine Corps from counterparts in other organizations. The military develops and implements continuous professional military education (PME) courses and schools that instruct Marines from the lowest level to the highest rank of leadership. All Marines at some point in their career will assume the role as leader. Therefore, from commissioned officer to junior enlisted, every rank from Private to General is educated in various forms of military accepted leadership.

Given the growth of the United States' defense budget since 9/11 (McCausland, 2008). Leaders have begun to stretch thin their knowledge and interpretation of what has become acceptable leadership versus what was once the only form of leadership. Current global and sociopolitical situations have shaped military leaders to become experts in national influence, planning, coordination, guidance, and decision-making (Liddy, 2002). Even as leadership is a core competency of every Marine, contemporary challenges in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted critical sociocultural knowledge gaps in leader development (Laurence, 2011). The ensuing discussion highlights key leadership considerations for Marines, as they are required to make decisions in the face of irregular, asymmetric, and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Today, Marine leaders face overwhelming instability, doubt, complexity, and ambiguity, more so than his or hers civilian counterparts. The complex characterization of a Marine leader's ability to lead and make decisions demands an understanding of his or her ability to lead, follow, and critically think and execute. Circumstances facing small unit leaders in current conflicts require that leaders are given the flexibility in his or hers assigned area while synchronizing their actions with strategic objectives (Szepesy, 2005).

Goleman (2004) discovered that although the traditionally associated qualities of leadership, e.g., resolve, strength, intelligence, and imagination, are necessary for success; they

are not enough to create a holistic leader. Ultimately, effective leaders distinguish themselves with a high level of emotional intelligence that includes self-awareness, motivation, empathy, self-control, and a greater use of social skills. Furthermore, Goleman established that leaders with high emotional intelligence scores may positively influence his or hers organizations performance and that emotional intelligence is twice as important as technical and IQ abilities.

Although overall intelligence among commanders is necessary, they must communicate clearly their commanders-intent to subordinates. Retired Lieutenant General Holder argued, “That an over-reliance on a rigid, methodical planning process and the relatively new doctrinal addition of commander’s intent had left...some subordinates without a clear understanding of the operation” (Chavous & Dempsey, 2013). Regardless of the intelligence model used, leaders must earn the trust and confidence of their subordinates to accomplish any mission within the parameters of not only the organization’s principles and traits of leadership but their clearly defined intent.

Over the past decade of war, an internal struggle between what the definition of a leader and the understanding of a manager has risen amongst the ranks. According to a U.S. Army informal poll that asked, “Leader or Manager.” Many of the respondents explained that the military leads troops and manages things (U.S. Army Company Commanders, 2011).

With a necessary break from the traditional military explanation of leadership and with Marine leaders considering a re-direction in leadership training and implementation; there must be a redefining of Marine Corps leadership that addresses the individual perceptions of what it means to lead. Leadership is how the Corps exercises its full range of international power and it should keep pace with not only the changing socio, political, and economic climate, but with more subtleties of militarism, such as emotional intelligence.

VI Dimensional Threats Facing U.S. Marines

a. Definition. Currently, conflicts around the globe have become politically, socially, and physically complicated. Conflicts over land – as observed between Spain and the United Kingdom with Gibraltar, governmental destabilization in Yemen and Venezuela, human atrocities in Syria and Africa, and impoverished states in India and Burma have blurred the lines of conflict containment.

Conflicts are no longer restricted to a region, religion, or state. Cross-border conflicts are happening more frequently and are leading to threats that are more unstable. The United States, in particular, can no longer depend on the security of distance between major warring states and its home shores. Through the advent of technology and an increase in the radicalization of ideologies, there is a clear and present threat to the United States, and her allies, from enemies near and far.

b. Structures and Similarities. The challenges faced by U.S. Marines today are unprecedented. Marines have to face threats in the conventional environments of war (land, sea, and air, aerospace) while, more recently, engaging in cyberspace and mind manipulation clashes. These threats are similar in that the enemy commits forces with the intent of dislodging their adversary either physically or through what has become recently popular, through the court of social media opinion. The military has termed this current type of unconventional warfare as asymmetrical. In understanding the structures of current threat dimensions challenging U.S. Marines, asymmetrical warfare must become implicit to all Marine leaders.

Asymmetrical warfare originally suggests a conflict between adversaries where military might and significance differ. However, contemporary military academics have broadened this definition to include dissimilar battlefield tactics and strategies between opposing forces. The recent hit-and-run tactics of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated an opponent's ability to think unconventionally from their adversary. Familiarity with their enemy's conventional tactics, their ability to disguise themselves amongst the civilian population, and being able to pick and choose the time and place of a battle are tactics and strategies used to offset the balance of the opposing force.

The four-dimensional threats facing Marines today are almost predictable. The Marine Corps has been engaged in land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 and have dominated the traditional battlefield with superior personnel (1,400,000), artillery pieces (1,299), tanks (8,848), aircraft (13,444), and ships (415). Even though, currently, the United States is ranked first among 126 other nations in current military capabilities (GFP, 2016). The early stage of the Iraq war, 2003, was the only time when this conventionality of warfare was effective; thus, giving way to increasing unconventional threats of cyber warfare and mind manipulation.

As early as 2009, it was assumed that only criminals used cyber-hacking (warfare) for nefarious purposes. Unlike conventional warfare where the U.S. fielded over 8,000 tanks against Iraq's 297 during the second Gulf War. Current battles are fought from the homes and desktops of new age "cyber warriors." Most famous of attacks against a conventional superpower, the United States, was from a single individual, Edward Snowden. Arguably, Edward Snowden hastened in an era where warfare went digital and where warriors needed to be less hardware and more software.

The final dimension of the conflict is mind manipulation. Today the news outlets, online sites, and social media are manipulating mass hysteria in an unprecedented way. Race-phobias, sexual-phobias, religious-phobias, and cultural phobias are all products of what the public sees and are manipulated by. News can no longer be trusted, for it is now looked at as 'fake news' and social media sites are being accused of fixing the subconscious of their users by implementing subtle propaganda on their websites in order to gain a particular outcome.

The dimensions of warfare are continually fluctuating, and as such, military thinkers and planners must adapt. The ideology that two mutually accepting forces will conduct a war on an even battlefield is naïve. U.S. Marines are no longer fighting uniformed soldiers allied to a country, but to uninformed individuals allied to an idea.

VII Toxic Leadership

a. Definition. As defined by Reed (2012), along with other scholars, a 'toxic leader' is a leader one who exhibits two distinct personality characteristics: (1) an outward lack of sympathy or empathy for the welfare of others, as observed by subordinates; and, (2) an interactive approach that creates a culture of mistrust and hostility (Reed, 2004).

The toxic military leader uses his commitment in accomplishing mission requirements by functioning at the low estrange of obligation to his or her troops. Although this may result in an effective mission, it ignores the continuum model of leadership. It is this current toxicity of negative leaders that undermine the structure of the leadership connection between themselves

and their subordinates; thus, destabilization unit morale, degrading subordinate motivation, creativity, and individual initiative.

b. Consequences. In an article entitled “How the U.S. Marines Encourage Service-Based Leadership” Lynch and Morgan (2017) cite a Gallup poll of 70% of workforce respondents who feel either “actively disengaged” or “not engaged.” Contrary to this, it is reported that the U.S. Marine Corps uses a *service-based leadership* approach that prioritizes the organization’s needs before that of the individual. Although there is some truth to Marine leaders eating last amongst their troops and never going to sleep before their men. The idea that action-based leadership is ubiquitous within Marine leaders is false.

Such dissent between Marine leaders and their subordinates can be witnessed by a large number of followers on social media pages such as *terminal lance*, *dysfunctional veterans*, *veterans brotherhood*, *Pg 11*, and the more recently controversial *Marines United*. These websites bring to light the arrogant way in which Marine leaders assume they have credulous obedience, authority, and leadership over their subordinates.

To very few junior Marines, the problem of toxic leadership is not surprising. It is estimated that for every ten soldiers, two are suffering from toxic leadership. What is surprising is how the U.S. military has been unaware of the degenerative effects toxic leadership has had on troop morale and good order and discipline. The consequences of mismanaged leadership remained unnoticed until an investigation of unusually high suicide rates exposed toxic leadership as a contributing factor. Although suicide is a personal act at which the military cannot take full responsibility. The choice to end one’s life has been exacerbated by the lack of empathic leadership shown to subordinates from military leaders. It can now be argued that U.S. casualties from toxic leadership rival casualties incurred in combat.

According to George Reed (2004) (as cited by Vergun, 2015), the consequence of toxic leadership is a 48% decrease in work effort followed by a 38% decrease in work quality. Early in the war on terrorism, no one in the military was talking about toxic leadership or how its effects would be felt a Marine generation later. Incidents such as a 2012 video showing U.S. Marine infantry urinating on dead Taliban fighters or the current social media scandal involving active and former Marines have led military insiders to question how they missed the current leadership conundrum.

Do these actions by subordinates indicate a loss of control by senior leaders, the lack of emotional intelligence, or the objective convictions needed to exercise good leadership? Assuming that perception is the reality, a synopsis of the current disenchantment by junior Marines would be telling on the real-time health of Marine Corps leadership.

In spite of this evidence, the U.S. Marine Corps will not openly substantiate the existence of a leadership problem and continues to maintain an appearance that there are no significant improprieties within its leadership. As an alternative, the Marines maintain that good leadership can be weighed by how many professional military courses a Marine leader has attended, how fast he or she can run 3-miles, how many tattoos he or she has, or how much he or she weighs. Such hubristic actions in failing to comprehensively evaluate the worth of leadership growth amongst its leaders and their effectiveness in leading are perpetual to toxic leadership.

Within the U.S. Marine Corps, leadership is communicated by mission accomplishment first and troop welfare second. Leadership in the mission is to train Marines to the standard of the military. However, what is omitted is any understanding of empathy toward the individual Marine. Troop welfare becomes a secondary footnote in the repertoire of many leaders.

Imposed Marine Corps linear priorities highlight mission accomplishment over other leadership capabilities and experiences, such as morale. Although there are no shortages of military leadership publications, journals, and courses on military leadership, mission accomplishment is still the apex of what makes a good Marine Corps leader.

Leaders are still leading troops underdeveloped, and ill prepared to balance leadership and the welfare of their troops simultaneously. The apparent practice of comprehensive leadership is absent from even the basic of Marine leaders. In its place is a determined focus on accomplishing the mission, often at the expense of the Marines and the overall morale health of the organization. Consequently, juniors become cynical of all Marine leaders, which trigger a leadership crisis. Additional research is needed to reinforce this paper as well as to answer the question "What can be done to prevent this cycle from continuing?"

The circumstances that have led to the U.S. Marine Corps being ambushed by the challenges of toxic leadership are difficult to explain, especially when it is inescapable to everyone but the leaders themselves. Nevertheless, whatever assumptions the Marines use to explain their leadership ethos to subordinates. They are regarded as lip service and are rendered invisible beyond mission accomplishment over troop welfare. In context to this review, Einstein theorized that simultaneous events between two observers might be viewed differently. Thus, peering through the pragmatic approaches to Marine Corps leadership from the viewpoints of Marines suffering under toxic leadership, that which is invisible to one observer [leaders] comes into focus to the rest [led].

VII Conclusion

Although attempting to formulate or conceptualize the idiosyncrasies of good leadership in a dozen pages is not practical. The fact of the matter is the quiet truths about Marine Corps leadership are the ones that allow us to rest easy at night. However, if the Marine Corps is genuinely an institution that America does not necessarily need, but one that it wants, then all Marines must become conscious that the internal leadership gaps troubling the Corps have second and third order effects of weakening the trust and confidence placed in them [the Marines].

Classifying societal problems as limited impacts to what many leaders may see as core values that are impervious to outside influences is arrogant. Current leadership trends have become an organizational failure that demands decisive solutions from all grades (McKenna, 2014). Therefore, current leaders must take up the responsibility of rebuilding the standards of leadership that the American public expects of their Marine Corps. A genuine answer to Marine leadership is not necessarily the ability to influence others or through a popular culture catch phrase. If we must make the impression of leadership easy for newer Marines to understand, there can be no better expression than "adaptable."

Bibliography

1. Bartlett, K., Burley, N., Dixon, D., Gannon, K., Knarr, K., & Schatz, S. (2012). Making Good Instructors Great: USMC Cognitive Readiness and Instructor Professionalization Initiatives. *Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference IITSEC* (pp. 1-13). Quantico, VA: Training and Education Command, United States Marine Corps.
2. Behling, O., & Roach, C. (1984). Functionalism: Basis for an alternate approach to the study of leadership. In D. Hosking, J. Hunt, C. Schriesheim, & E. Stewart, *In Leaders and Managers: International Perspectives on Managerial Behavior and Leadership*. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
3. Bennis, W. (1959). Leadership theory and administrative behavior: The problem of authority. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4, 259-260.
4. Brown, T., Phillips, J., Rivera, I., Ross, K., Smith, K., Tegan, F., et al. (2012). *Development for the Initial Small Unit Decision Making (SUDM) Assessment Battery*. Arlington, VA: Marine Corps Training and Education Command.
5. Carson, C., & King, J. (2005). Leaving leadership: Solving leadership problems through empowerment. *Management Decision*, 43(7/8), 1049-1053.
6. Chavous, J., & Dempsey, R. (2013). Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations. *Military Review*, 93(6), 58-66.
7. Clawson, J. (2006). *Level Three Leadership: Getting below the surface*. New York: Pearson.
8. Cojocar, W. (2011). Adaptive Leadership in the Military Decision-Making Process. *Military Review*, 91(6), 29.
9. Collins, J. (2001). *Good To Great*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
10. deGrandpre, A. (2015, December 20). Amos investigation unsealed: Anger, confusion, controversy. *Military Times*.
11. Dye, J. (2011). *Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons of Marine Corps NCO*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
12. Flavel, J. (1999). Cognitive Development: Children's Knowledge About the Mind. *Children's Knowledge About the Mind*, 50, 21-45.
13. Friedman, S. (2009). Behavior fundamentals: Filling the behavior-change toolbox. *Journal of Applied Companion Animal Behavior*, 3(1), 36-40.

14. Gehler, C. (2005). *Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
15. GFP. (2016, January 16). *Current Military Capabilities and Available Firepower for 2016*. Retrieved April 9, 2017, from United States of America Military Strength: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=united-states-of-america
16. Goleman, D. (2004, January). What Makes a Leader. *Harvard Business Review*, pp. 1-2.
17. Krulak, C. (1999). *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the three block war*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned.
18. Laurence, J. (2011). Military Leadership and The Complexity of Combat and Culture. *Military Psychology*, 23(5), 489-501.
19. Liddy, L. (2002). The Strategic Corporal. *Australian Army Journal*, 2(3), 139-148.
20. Lilley, K. (2016, July 31). The millennials have taken over: A primer for the military's generational shift. *Military Times*.
21. Lynch, C., & Morgan, A. (2017, February 2). How the U.S. Marines Encourage Service-Based Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*.
22. McCausland, J. (2008). *Developing strategic leaders for the 21st century*. Carlisle: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute.
23. McKenna, B. (2014). A Quiet Truth: A case for a leadership reckoning. *Marine Corps Gazette*, 98(9).
24. McLeod, S. (2009). *BF Skinner: Operant conditioning*. Retrieved February 13, 2017
25. National Research Council. (2012). *Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
26. Parker, K. (2017, March 10). Not your daddy's marines. *The Oregonian*.
27. Pripoae-Serbanescu, C. (2012). PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY LEADER'S DECISION. *Strategic Impact*, 42, 141-147.
28. Reed, G. (2004). Toxic Leadership. *Military Review*, 67-71.
29. Rothwell, W. (2010). *Effective Succession Planning: Ensuring Leadership Continuity and Building Talent from Within* (4th ed.). Washington, D.C.: American Management Association.
30. Sun, T. (2009). From Change Management to Change Leadership. *International Academy of Management and Business*, (pp. 1-12).
31. Swain, R. (1973). *Selected Papers of General William E. Depuy*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

32. Szepesy, J. (2005). *The strategic corporal and the emerging battlefield*. Tufts University.
33. The Basic School. (2013). *Human Factors*. Camp Barrett, VA: United States Marine Corps.
34. U.S. Army Company Commanders. (2011). Do We Need Leaders or Managers?, (pp. 1-5).
35. Vergun, D. (2015, October 19). *Toxic leaders decrease Soldiers' effectiveness, experts say*. Retrieved January 18, 2017, from U.S. Army: https://www.army.mil/article/157327/Toxic_leaders_decrease_Soldiers