Marine Corps Leadership: Understanding the Gap between Emotional Intelligence and Cognitive Intelligence

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Abstract: The current conflicts between uniformed armies and insurgent forces have changed the way in which wars are fought. As a consequence the need for military leaders who can self-regulate their emotions and actions during active engagements is necessary as current battles are fought and decided in non-general conflicts of attrition. Current leaders must be able to control their emotions, the emotions of others, and of groups in asymmetrical environments where quick thinking can be contradictory to the standardized way of viewing military leadership and intelligence. Within the last decade, the U.S. Army categorized leadership into five stages: emotional, social, spiritual, family, and physical. However, when investigating the emotional competency further, Taylor-Clark discovered that emotional intelligence was misrepresented when defined against traditional Army cognitive intelligence. The purpose of this paper was to understand if Taylor-Clark's investigation of emotional versus cognitive intelligence in the U.S. Army is an appropriate discussion within the U.S. Marine Corps' leadership doctrine.

Keywords: leadership, emotional competence, cognitive intelligence, military

I. Introduction

At present the U.S. military is adapting to a changing socio-political environment that, at times, contradicts the actionable purpose of the armed forces. Gender-neutral military occupational specialties (MOS), religious freedom in uniform, sexual orientations, political correctness, and social media issues are forcing the military to reconsider its approaches to leadership—which are traditionally handled through intellectual and cognitive methods.

Taylor-Clark (2015) explored the connection between emotional intelligence (EI) competencies and the qualities and capabilities required of a U.S. Army leader. The goal of this paper was to understand if there were gaps in the consideration and acceptance of emotional competencies among Marine leaders or if the Marine Corps are building these skills without using language related to the term 'emotional competencies. 'Additionally, if emotional competencies' are taught and assessed as part of a leaders' career development, are they positively reinforced and influential to mission accomplishment.

Emotional competence could be argued as being essential to military leadership –similar to cognitive intelligence (CI). Therefore, the exploration of emotional competence as it corresponds to the cognitive intelligence of Marine leaders is interchangeable with the term 'emotional intelligence,' and is the framework of this paper.

The Marine Corps' interpretation of leadership traits and principles (justice, judgment, dependability, integrity, decisiveness, tact, initiative, endurance, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and enthusiasm), also known by the acronym, JJ DID TIE BUCKLE, supports the initial framework (Air University, 2014).

II. The Communication of Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence is the ability to govern personal emotions and the emotions of others. Emotional intelligence is a soft skill dependent on the abilities of the individual. Persons within understanding of emotional intelligence can accept their feelings as sensitive, interpret them, and recognize how these emotions can affect others. Although Mayer and Salovey (1990) coined the term *emotional intelligence*, Daniel Goleman popularized five elements of emotional intelligence: (1) Self-awareness, (2) Self-regulation, (3) Motivation, (4) Empathy, and (5) Social skills (Goleman, What makes a leader?, 2004).

Self-awareness is a leader capability to understand their feelings and interpret how their emotions and behaviour influence others. In addition, self-awareness when in a leadership position means understanding one's capabilities and limitations through humility.

Self-regulation in leadership is about control. A leader, who can self-regulate his or her emotions by refraining from attacking someone (verbally or physically), resisting stereotypes, and embracing their values in the face of opposition, is a leader who can successfully self-regulate. According to Goleman (2004), self-regulation is also a leadership quality rooted in personal accountability.

Motivation is an emotional capacity that requires the leader to regulate not just the motivations of their subordinates, but theirs as well. Self-motivation is probably the easiest to

fake, and group motivation is the most difficult. Self-motivators are consistent in their approach to the quality of their work and the standards they set individually.

Empathy is perhaps the most difficult emotional trait of a leader. It involves the ability to perceive the viewpoint of others and to identify with his or her feelings and emotions. A leader who does not have social awareness of their subordinates will not be empathetic in their leadership. Genuine empathy, however, builds trust in leading others through counselling, networking, and empathetic listening.

Social skills are essential in developing trust with subordinates through communication. Leaders who cannot effectively communicate their commands will be unsuccessful. Leaders who have good social skills are diplomatic in conflict resolution and are good at managing change during a crisis.

The fundamental theory of emotional intelligence, as constructed by Mayer and Salovey (1990) discussed emotional intelligence as hypothesized abilities that add to the honest assessment and appearance of emotion, the active control of emotions, and the use of emotional situations to inspire, design, and achieve success within others and oneself. Caruso, Mayer, &Salovey(1999) developed the Emotional Intelligence Test, Version 2 (MSCEIT v.2) which identifies, in differing degrees, specific cognitive competencies that exist in all humans. The focus on how psychological emotions can enable cognition and flexible behavior are the strengths of this model. The Emotional Intelligence Test is based on individual feelings toward the questions and allows an EI score to be ranked on characteristics distinctive from traditional cognitive or aptitude measurements. Furthermore, the MSCEIT v.2 identifies character or leadership quality as a result of emotional aptitudes, and assumes methods in understanding and managing individual and group emotions.

III. Emotional Intelligence within Marine Leaders

Current tensions around the globe have made the discussion and significance of EIin controvertible to military leadership. Unconventional conflicts, small wars, regional instabilities, piracy, and even cyber-terrorism are examples of the flexibility expected of a military leader.References such as the *Marine Corps War fighting Publication – Leading Marines* (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2014) and the current Small Unit Decision Making Initiative (Brown, et al., 2012) are two leadership references Marines use to guide their decisions in and out of combat. However, these are no longer enough.

The research for this paper consisted of reviewing over 25 peer-reviewed articles, military publications, and books on military leadership. Few conclusively defined the term 'emotional intelligence,' although many discussed its characteristics. The lack of conclusive Marine Corps standards and explanation of emotional intelligence offers evidence that military training and leadership development does not support the referencing of emotional competencies or individual traits that have been recognized as fundamental to good leadership (Goleman, What makes a leader?, 2004).

Current combat environments leave little room for the seemingly softer side of leadership which can be assumed as the reason why the military avoids training its members to be sensitive to their emotions. However, the absence of genuine empathy in leadership can create a void in emotional awareness among subordinates and within oneself.

Additionally, studies have shown that emphasis in training regarding emotional intelligence is as significant to a leader's accomplishments as their intelligence quotient. Consequently, academics and military leaders can no longer ignore emotional intelligence. The years of ordering a Marine to 'charge a hill' – without knowing why – are over. In a perfect world, it would seem that this is all that is needed: an officer issues a lawful order and that order is carried out to the best of the subordinate's abilities. However, leaders can no longer assume that their status as officers is enough to ensure that orders are executed.

Leaders of Marines must instead begin to master both their cognitive and emotional abilities. However, many current military leaders exhibit biases towards an emotional thinker. For example, those proficient at using emotional acumen to resolve conflicts negotiate, or correct others are seen as arrogant and are not humble in how they presumably overstate the significance of their work. There is the paradox of excluding individuals based on their sensitive abilities: if an emotional leader does not display a proclivity to their emotional side, there is a chance of possibly discarding innovative solutions, and instead following the path of conformity.

Arguably, Marine leaders who exhibit EI are often not easy to work with as they are in constant conflict between their individual abilities to influence others and the conformist traditional roles of cognitive thinking. This transient skill between empathetic and cognitive leadership can be laborious because it involves a continuous adjustment between the 'emotional' thinking needed to deal with people, and the 'logical' thinking necessary to deal with processes. However, empathy in leadership is also about getting others to follow while demonstrating a superior cognitive intelligence.

Adding to the challenge of switching between emotional and cognitive intelligence, the Marines Corps expects its leaders to display a high level of technical skills while being able to listen and orally communicate, be adaptable and creative, confident, motivated, demonstrate initiative, and take satisfaction in one's work. However, this explanation is null to a leader who exhibits emotional intelligence in a predominately-cognitive environment and who has been disciplined for overstepping the boundaries of their billet due to emotional initiatives.

Individuals who demonstrate increased awareness to emotional tendencies are self-motivated and need little direction to operate independently. These people believe that if they had to communicate every workable plan before its implementation, leadership that does not share their vision would slow the outcome. Senior leaders may want the results of resourcefulness and initiative that energizes a person to thrive, but secretly they find subordinates with divergent emotional traits difficult to manage. Thus, the appearance of wanting leaders with intangible skills is masked by the reality that because emotional aptitude cannot be conclusively quantified, many leaders are not comfortable accepting its implementation among subordinates. This dichotomy between leader expectations and function are explained in the Marine Corps' leadership traits and principles, where implied emotional leadership goes hand-in-hand with specific leadership objectives.

IV. Cognitive Intelligence within Marine Leaders

Inside the military, operations are frequently unpredictable. Unexpected tactics, new technologies, different applications of current equipment, and surprise are friction points within combat and non-combat engagements. Military leaders also face unanticipated challenges – such as non-kinetic military environments like peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and crisis

response actions. Current military leaders must learn to adapt to these situations with quick and decisive reasoning through controlled cognitive processes.

All members of the military are ready to shoulder regular duties and responsibilities, and much can be done to prepare them for expected mission environments. How then do leaders train individuals and units for the unexpected – which by explanation is something that cannot be anticipated? The traditional response has been to train smarter soldiers through an almost "Borglike" mentality of teaching and education. As explained by Fletcher and Morrison's (2002) interpretation of the U.S. military's approach to mental preparedness through cognitive intelligence:

Mental preparedness is the psychological preparation (including skills, knowledge, abilities, motivations, and personal dispositions) an individual needs to establish and sustain competent performance in the complex and unpredictable environment of modern military operations (pp. 1–3).

Cognitive intelligence is a leader's ability to reason within the boundaries of their cognitive schemas. Cognitive awareness can be researched as traditional, intellectual intelligence in young children and adults, in job performance, intelligence competencies, managerial effectiveness, and within personality traits. However, when cognitive intelligences researched in association with the U.S. Marine Corps leadership principles and traits, there is only an acknowledgment: that there exists an ability to comprehend and effectively manoeuvre in current cognitive and cultural battlefield environments. Along with emotional intelligence, additional in-depth research is needed to uncover cognitive intelligence in the Marine Corps as a standalone intelligence quotient of leadership.

V. Two Sides of Leadership: U.S. Army Leader Doctrine and U.S. Marine Corps Leadership Traits and Principles

There are two soldiery categories of military leadership: Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and Commissioned officers, each with unique roles and responsibilities based on rank. Additionally, the billet conditions of each require a zero-fraternization tolerance between enlisted and officer. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect differing approaches to leadership and possible varying levels of emotional intelligence within leaders of the same branch, or within the same unit.

If Army leadership amounts to an austere environment situated separately from the larger civil-soldier world, then Marine leadership resembles the ideal symbol of worship by an entire organization. Marine Corps leadership has formed into an all-specialized existence that is the totem of the whole service.

Marines are prepared for leadership from day one of Boot Camp, and despite the rigors of yearly rifle qualifications and high standards of physical fitness, a Marine pilot or truck driver, who would not necessarily make a good infantryman, would be able to effectively lead any group of Marines indistinguishable from billet or rank. The icon of leadership is the connection that creates a significant strength in camaraderie throughout the Corps.

U.S. Army Leader Doctrine

To appreciate the correlation between Army leadership doctrine and Marine Corps principles, one must first understand the leader requirements outlined in the U.S. Army's leadership manual and within the Marine Corps traits and principles.

The U.S. Army has leader attributes and core competencies that all soldiers are expected to assume.

CHARACTER	PRESENCE	INTELLECT
Army Standards	Military and professional bearing	Cognitive flexibility
• Compassion	Physical fitness	Sound judgment
Warrior tenets	Self-confidence	Initiative
Restraint	• Flexibility	Personal tact
LEADS	DEVELOPS	ACHIEVES
Leads subordinates	Creates a positive environment	Gets results
Builds trust	Organizes self	
Extends influence	Develops others	
• Leadership by example	Administrators of communication	

Figure 1. The Army Leadership Requirements Model.

Leader attributes among Army soldiers are unique individual characteristics that regulate learning and performance; *character*, *presence*, and *intellect* create this foundation of leadership. As referenced from the U.S. Army's leader developmental handbook, leader attributes are (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2015):

- "Character. A leader of character internalizes the Army Values, lives by our Professional Military Ethic, reflects the Warrior Ethos, and displays empathy towards Soldiers, Families and those people affected by the unit's actions. Character principles and traits are central to a leader's core identity. In our profession, competence places an individual in a position to lead character makes him or her effective leader.
 - Presence. A leader of presence has credibility, exudes confidence, and builds trust. Presence is conveyed through actions, appearance, demeanor, and words.
 - Intellect. A leader of intelligence has the conceptual capability to understand complex situations, determine what needs to be done and interact with others to get it done. Leaders must have the ability to reason, to think critically and creatively, to anticipate consequences, and to solve problems."

According to the U.S. Army doctrine (2015) for leadership, leader competencies provide a distinct and uniform way of transmitting expectations and leadership responsibilities to Army

leaders. The leader skills are applicable across all military occupational specialties and throughout all leader positions.

Capabilities are proven through performances that can be easily observed and evaluated by a selection of leaders and followers, e.g. supervisors, subordinates, supporters, and advisors. As cited directly from the U.S. Army's leader developmental handbook (2015), leader competencies are:

- "One who leads? Provides vision through purpose, motivation, universal respect, and direction to guide others. Extends one's influence beyond the chain of command to build partnerships and alliances to accomplish complex work. Leading is conveyed by communicating (imparting ideas) and setting the example.
- One who develops leads organizations by creating and maintaining a positive environment and by investing effort in their broadening, and that of others, to achieve depth and breadth. Developing includes assessing needs to improve self, others, and the organization.
- One who achieves. Focuses on what needs to be accomplished. Has an expeditionary mindset and can adapt to unanticipated, changing, and uncertain situations. Achieving in the short term is about getting results, but in the long-term, it is about setting the vision to obtain objectives.

U.S. Marine Corps Leadership Traits and Principles

The U.S. Marine Corps defines leadership in 14 traits and 11 principles to emphasize to its Marines that leadership is a behavior, not a position (Air University, 2014). Leadership is about empowering subordinates to complete a task with as little supervision as possible. Leadership is meant to be constructive and not oppressive through guidance and procedural protocols.

> Judgement	> Enthusiasm
> Justice	> Bearing
Decisiveness	Unselfishness
> Initiative	> Courage
> Dependability	> Knowledge
> Tact	> Loyalty
> Integrity	> Endurance

Figure 2. Marine Corps Leadership Traits.

Know yourself and seek self-improvement.	> Set the example.
➤ Be technically and tactically proficient.	Know your Marines and look out for their welfare.
Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates.	Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.
Make sound and timely decisions.	Keep your Marines informed.
Ensure assigned tasks are understood, supervised, and accomplished.	
Train your Marines as a team.	
Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.	

Figure 3. Marine Corps Leadership Principles.

If there are any recognized consistencies within the Marine Corps'14 leadership traits and 11 principles, it is that none stand apart or are placed ahead of others. They are networked and mutually supporting, similar to the mechanisms of a well-made watch or the mechanics in a multi-part device. Remove one and the entirety is affected: if time slips on the watch, the device breaks down. Without unselfishness, there may be no dependability; without integrity, there is no loyalty.

Additionally, leadership in the Marine Corps is based on the foundation that inspiring Marines to accomplish a specific result involves a leader who is the ideal example of the Corps' traits and principles of leadership. The Marine Corps leadership is best summarized as areadiness to accomplish any task above expectations through shared hardship, despite the misery or tediousness of the task. Marine leadership, supposedly, inspires complex actions of performance at all levels and creates the credibility of the leader through performance.

VI. The Gap between Military Cognitive Intelligence and Emotional Intelligence

The description of a good Marine leader is one who exemplifies the Corps' leadership traits and principles and who participates over delegates. The Marine publication *Leading Marines* asserts that a leader can achieve organizational and personal preparedness by means of

discipline, instruction, and readiness (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2014). However, the leadership doctrine does not specifically consider or explain how to emotionally prepare for the rigors of military leadership, other than displaying self-control. In addition, the Corps' leadership traits and principles do not discuss emotional intelligence in leaders, although they are explicit in explaining to leaders the must-haves of emotional intelligence – enthusiasm (knowing one's Marines) and developing a sense of responsibility among subordinates – again, without explaining how to develop these attributes outside the fundamentals of practical cognitive intelligence.

Interestingly when researched, cognitive intelligence is almost always is associated with EI among all comparable characteristics. Bradberry and Greaves (2009) discovered that emotional understanding requires effective communication between the emotional and cognitive centers of the brain, and that roughly 36 percent of individuals tested were able to accurately describe his or her emotions as they occurred. These results postulate that emotional intelligence or the understanding of one's emotions is the strongest transmitter of leadership.

Cognitive skills are those competencies that relate to objective knowledge such as knowing standardized information or being able to recite knowledge that is commonly used and understood. Cognitive intelligence can be measured.

Emotional intelligence deals with individual characteristics where assessments can be difficult to interpret, let alone accept. There are, however, assessments of personal knowledge about theories of emotional intelligence – as examined by Mayer and Salovey (1990) and Goleman (2004) – but no actual tangible level of using these skills exists, notably within the Marine Corps. Instead, supposed emotional intelligence examinations are usually self-reported psychological sketches.

The gap between emotional and cognitive intelligence among Marine leaders has been found to be difficult to quantify conclusively. A person may be thought of as 'intelligent 'if he or she can support abstract thought. However, for an individual conception such as 'emotional intelligence' to be categorized as an actual intelligence, three norms must be identified(Mayer & Salovey, 1990). First, a general criterion that replicates a cognitive function against a conventional approach to behavior must be recognized. Second, EI must conform to correlation benchmarks centered on practical measures and illustrate closely allied capabilities that are comparable to, but separate from, cognitive abilities already defined by a traditional intelligence. Finally, through age and experience, intelligence must evolve. Having said this, emotional intelligence within the Marine Corps has been difficult to discern from traditional intelligence because compassion is only the second pillar of a Marine leader, with the first pillar being mission accomplishment.

Undoubtedly, the description of 'compassion' may not be the first characteristic that comes to mind when thinking about an outfit whose members call themselves "Devil Dog." Nevertheless, compassion through troop welfare is the Corps' second leadership pillar and is distantly followed by personal needs. The Marine leader's internal strength to value the wellbeing of their Marines before their own encourages others to pay it forward to other members of the organization, take proactive steps to assist the leader, and pledge their resolute loyalty and obedience to follow all orders and directives.

Individual cognitive intelligence and practical experiences are relevant, but emotional intelligence is the sine qua non of leadership (Cole, Humphrey, & Walter, 2011). An enhanced appreciation of the importance of emotional intelligence by military leaders is needed as it

associates with cognitive intelligence among military leaders. First, the more emotionally equipped the leader the more inclined they are to have success in leading troops in dynamic or non-kinetic environments. Second, emotional intelligence has been recognized as being critical to mission accomplishment, which – in the military – is the ultimate goal of any unit commander. Additionally, it has been identified that if leaders and followers predetermine the outcome of a task, the mission has a higher chance of success. Finally, if there are identifiable advantages in training and building military leaders or units associating emotional intelligence and individual leader efficiency, the relationships and its benefit should be vigorously pursued.

Currently, there is an evolving understanding that emotional intelligence is critical to workplace success. Studies suggest that emotional competency – more than IQ – determines the success rate of professionals and accounts for 58% of performance in all job categories. Additionally, researches shown that while an individual's cognitive intelligence remains consistent throughout a person's life, emotional intelligence can be increased.

Recognizable characteristics of emotional intelligence are self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills. The ability for a leader to improve on emotional competencies is to: (1) objectively observe others, (2) practice humility, (3) introspect weaknesses, and (4) self-examine how stressors impact decisions, and how those decisions affect others. Capitalizing on an individual's EI leads to an awareness of how leadership affects those around you through listening and empathy. The gap between cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence in leadership is analytical and requires more research.

VII. Recommendations for Future Research

Long before it appeared in the commercial sector, the U.S. military had been examining leadership and leadership development, maintaining that unit effectiveness is influenced by leadership, esprit de corps, and organizational solidarity. However, within the leader publication *Leading Marines*, emotional intelligence is not covered and the term 'emotional 'is only mentioned twice – with neither in relation to the characteristics of a leader.

Competency studies on leadership have discovered that a leader's emotional intelligence makes up a significant amount of the variance in performance prediction. Organizations today employ trained psychologists to design 'competency models' to assist in recruiting, training, and promoting competent company leaders. Goleman (2004) identified three categories significant to these models: *technical skills*, *cognitive abilities*, and *emotional intelligence*. Researched further, intellect alone can be a measurement of outstanding leadership performance within higher echelons of management. Moreover, the numbers of qualified and like-minded professionals notes emotional intelligence as being increasingly important at higher levels of an organization where differences in technical skills are negated.

Goleman's investigation found that the more senior a leader's rank or billet assignment was, the more emotional aptitude became ubiquitous in their overall success over others. Thus, it is first recommended to further investigate the implementation of Mayer and Salovey's (1999) Emotional Intelligence Test to explore the emotional intelligence of leaders comparative to their cognitive intelligence of the Marine Corps leadership traits and principles.

Due to research constraints, the dissimilarities between enlisted personnel's and officer's EIswas not investigated in this paper. On applying anecdotal evidence regarding leadership traits between non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers, NCOs are found to have a relatively higher emotional intelligence score than commissioned officers. There is an apparent strong connection between a leader's emotional aptitude and their effectiveness. Grounded in this data senior Marine leaders could consider that NCOs place greater importance on understanding their subordinates' emotions, along with their own ability to use their emotions to accomplish the mission.

NCOs are the backbone of the Corps and are expected to display certain interpersonal skills when dealing with subordinates. By using the Emotional Intelligence Test, Version 2 (MSCEIT v.2) on U.S. Army soldiers, research has shown that the NCOs' emphasis on others – rather than themselves – was higher when compared to that of commissioned officers. Therefore, it can be concluded that NCOs value emotions when taking care of and motivating others.

Second, this researcher recommends that Marine leadership training comprise both physical training and assessments in EI. Literature review conducted on emotional intelligence has revealed that emotional understanding is an essential component to leadership. Research supports emotional intelligence as an indispensable trait important in encouraging followers and those leaders must be familiar with their individual emotions and the emotions of others. Research has also shown that if an individual's emotional intelligence is high, that person may be successful in their responsibilities (Meadows, 2015).

Third, the Marine Corps could create more balanced Marines by complementing a leader's cognitive intelligence with their emotional competencies. By using emotional competency assessments, higher emotional intelligence scores could result in higher self-efficacy. This would result in a stronger ability to lead and be led.

Bradberry and Greaves (2009) outlined strategies for constructing EI; in their book *Emotional Intelligence 2.0*.Self-awareness and social awareness are strategies that address all aspects of emotional intelligence. The U.S. Marine Corps could benefit by incorporating this knowledge into its leadership doctrine.

Self-Awareness Strategies:

- •Quit identifying emotions as positive or negative: Good or bad, emotions will run their course if opinions are suspended.
- Observe the ripple effect of your emotions: Your emotions affect everyone around you. Embrace discomfort: Instead of avoidance, emotion good or bad should be sought out and worked through.
- •Understand your physical emotions: The body and mind are tightly connected; physical responses can help one understand one's emotions.
- Know who and what pushes your emotions: Knowing your triggers can help you manage them.

• Watch yourself like a hawk: Develop an objective view of your emotions as you are experiencing them.

Some of the strategies the Military would be wise to incorporate into their training for commissioned officers, in order to develop their OEAare listed below.

Social Awareness Strategies:

- Watch body language: Eye contact, facial expressions, and posture will give clues to a person's emotions.
- Go on a 15-minute tour: Similar to 'management by walking around, 'the mission of this tour is to walk around observing the emotions in and mood of the workplace.
- Practice the art of listening: Set aside distractions and fully observe and listen to the person communicating in order to sense emotions as well as hear the message.
- Test for accuracy: When in doubt, just ask. Ask if what you're observing in people or the situation is actually what is occurring.

The information collected in this study showed a distinctive gap in military literature explaining emotional intelligence with no explicit language clarifying the direct use and/or understanding of emotional acumen in leadership. Future research should also investigate: 1) better emotional intelligence developmental programs and 2) create coordinating instructions on how to effectively use emotional intelligence within current leadership doctrine.

VIII. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to understand if Taylor-Clark's investigation of emotional versus cognitive intelligence in the U.S. Army is an appropriate discussion within the U.S. Marine Corps leadership doctrine. As with Taylor-Clark's analysis, this study has uncovered that the U.S. Marine Corps' leadership policies and practices fails to recognize a direct connection between individual emotional intelligence and the Corps' leadership traits and principles, although implying that emotions are an integral part of the Marine Corps' view of a competent leader.

The apparent lack of emphasis or awareness of emotional intelligence in doctrinal leadership or development within the Marine Corps is naïve, considering the current sociopolitical climate. There are doctrinal gaps of emotional intelligence not found in past or current Marine Corps leadership publications. When qualities associated to emotional intelligence were defined in the Marines' doctrine, there were no coordinating or subsequent guidance for how leaders were to develop emotional intelligence as a leadership trait. There are; however, numerous doctrine on cognitive intelligence for leadership. This is surprising considering the link between cognitive intelligence and general intelligence has been well-documented with evidence also suggesting a connection between cognitive ability and emotional intelligence.

Twenty-five years after Salovey and Mayer introduced the concept of emotional intelligence; it remains important to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research (Mayer & Salovey, 1990). Emotional intelligence focuses on the mental abilities of an individual to apply knowledge and information provided by emotions for the improvement of cognitive capabilities. The present paper brings together articles, theories, and ideas established

from previous studies conclusions on the relevance of emotional intelligence in different domains of daily life, including workplace performance (i.e. leadership). Although investigators and academics debate whether emotional intelligence impacts cognitive abilities beyond the well-known contribution of IQ and personality traits. This paper was meant to serve as an exploratory literature review of the Marine Corps training and understanding of emotional intelligence.

The difference in leadership perceptions of emotional intelligence can influence a leader's overall cognitive intelligence and thus their success as leaders. There is a real need for further exploratory studies that may involve surveying non-commissioned and commissioned officers separately or applying current emotional intelligence measurements to establish a baseline among Marines. Together these studies may suggest that emotional intelligence is a relevant and useful variable for understanding and explaining various human emotions within leadership, although further research could explain its importance relative to cognitive intelligence.

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I Introduction

It has been 18 years since former Marine Commandant General Charles Krulak, conceived the term "Three Block War" (Krulak, 1999). The Three Block War is a fictitious story of Corporal Hernandez and the Marines of 2nd Platoon, Lima Company. Operating thousands of miles from the center of Marine Corps leadership, Marines are expected to display a high level of cognitive acuity to leadership and military bearing that embodies what it means to be a United States Marine. Successes of such a demanding position under severe conditions require an unwavering maturity, unparalleled decision-making abilities, and intestinal fortitude.

In the current period of 24-hour media and frontline reporting, every decision a Marine makes may be tried in the press and by the opinions of social media. General Krulak, "In many cases, the individual Marine [leader] will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation but the operational and strategic levels as well" (Krulak, 1999; Liddy, 2002). As the politicization of the U.S. military increases so too does leadership amongst Marines. As indispensable as the U.S. Marine Corps is for the preservation of democracy and to U.S. foreign diplomacy, it is critical to redefine and re-educate Marines on effective military leadership.

II The Marine Corps Leadership

Leadership, "The process by which an agent prompts a subordinate to behave in a desired manner" (Bennis, 1959) or "The process of influencing an organized group towards accomplishing its goals" (Behling & Roach, 1984). Although few Marines can independently agree on what makes a good, if not great, Marine leader. All will agree that the foundation for their success as leaders originates from the Marine Corps leadership traits and principles (Dye, 2011). Found in any locker room or collegiate ethics binder - dedication, initiative, selflessness, and integrity - are qualities apparent to even the casual observer. However, some not-so-obvious like *tact*, define the way Marines think twice before making decisions of professional courtesy.

Marine Corps leadership is not a catch phrase or a gimmick. The Marine Corps is held together by the authority of its leaders and where its structures and procedures are only useful if individual subordinate Marines give faith to that system. Highly motivated and well-trained individuals provide the only guarantee that the Marines are capable of such, almost, blind following from its members.

There are numerous approaches to leadership and proponents of each proclaim his or her "style" more effective over the rest; Piaget, Friedman, Skinner, Barge and Fairhurst, and Marine Corps leaders themselves. However, a Marine must exercise an adaptable leadership predisposition in accordance with the situation in which he or she finds himself or herself. Leadership in warfare is not that complicated nor is it suggested to be easy; however, it is deceptively simple (Swain, 1973). Marine leaders receive numerous hours of instruction on threat-focused decision-making, initiative-based training, acclimatization, responsive and adjustment procedures, and counteroffensive and defensive techniques (Cojocar, 2011).

Piaget's (Flavel, 1999) cognitive theory explaining the process of child developmental as a form of adaptation resulting from biological maturation and environmental experience is a learning concept for Marines. The ability to understand an environment is based on how the individual interprets their reality created by previous experiences. However, if there are no skills to scaffold from, the Marine Corps adopts objectivism to replace constructivism.

The Corps' training and education objectives assume newer Marines understand their role is to learn, while it is the job of the educated, more senior Marines, to teach them. Education for these Marines is to learn only the objective truth of their environment as taught to them by their leaders. Individual decision-making about the environment is stripped away and replaced with strict objectivism. Nevertheless, to ensure the end-state of creating effective Marine leaders, shaping is also commonplace.

Shaping correlates directly to the procedural reinforcement of a progressive sequence of subtle behavioral modifications toward a particular conduct, beginning with the initial molding of a civilian to a Marine in boot camp. The implementation of Marine Corps leadership shaping procedures requires; however, an opposite approach to Friedman who discusses shaping as a subtle, natural variation in the way actions are performed (Friedman, 2009). The Marine Corps shapes its required behaviors forcefully and aggressively.

B.F. Skinner's 'operant conditioning' believes that there should be a focus on the observable origins to behavior as an alternative to rationalizing the internal cognitive beliefs of individuals (McLeod, 2009). However, a difference between Skinner's 'operant conditioning' and 'classical conditioning' when referencing Marine Corps leadership is that leadership in the Marine Corps does not look for a voluntary response that may be followed by a reinforcing stimulus. In contrast, Marine leaders look to classical conditioning when a stimulus automatically triggers an involuntary response (e.g., using rifle range targets that look like

humans, dehumanizing the enemy) (The Basic School, 2013). Thus, the Corps's ethos of *loyalty* and *instant willingness obedience to orders* go against conventional and contemporary theories of individual changes in behavior.

In met cognition, *thinking about thinking* (Bartlett, Burley, Dixon, Gannon, Knarr, & Schatz, 2012), though widely acceptable in civilian society, is a danger to the good order and discipline of n the Corps. Marines are led through a push-pull method with little room for subjective interpretation. However, after over a decade and a half of asymmetrical conflicts, the Corps' is beginning to identify trends of newer Marines who are joining with a greater sense of self-awareness, self-assuredness, and with an advanced comprehension of metacognition. Therein lays the next evolution of Marine Corps leadership; *leadership*, the experience of leaders, becoming cognitively self-aware through systematic thinking (Pripoae-Serbanescu, 2012).

III Requirements of Good Leadership

Ar-Rutbah, Rawa, H t, and Baghdadi were battles fought by U.S. Marines throughout the second Gulf War. Over ten years later, the names of these cities are fading and carelessly so too are the leadership lessons learned. The most incredulous mistake leaders from these battles could make, are to let time lapse experience and be replaced with SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) written after the fact.

Decision-making in leadership as a researchable and teachable subject area can be viewed with mixed success. At worst, research in leadership and instruction can be a tedious labyrinth of inconsistent definitions and misdirected findings. Although some leadership theorists may separate the definitions of leadership and decision-making (Carson & King, 2005), others offer a solution to the state of molasses that has become leadership within the Marine Corps. Carson & King (2005) proposed a solution to separate, via empowerment, recognized leadership practices and definitions from the vague institutional [Marine Corps] constructs of leadership and decision-making, as they may be traditionally defined, and into constructs with much more effectiveness and functionality. One such construct is that of empowerment.

The emergence of numerous threats has added a complexity to war, the multiplicity of individuals involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of armed conflict (Cojocar, 2011). Insurgent and extremist strategies, the frequency of unstable conflicts, difficulty within a socio-developmental region, and importance on decentralizing operations have created leadership and decision-making challenges amongst leaders. If unit leaders are not empowered to make decisions within an asymmetrical battle space, they will become predisposed to delay their actions while waiting for orders and information (Gehler, 2005).

Dispersed operations, adaptive adversaries, rules of engagement, and mission diversity have shown gaps in training, technology procurement and implementation, and personnel management within the Marine Corps. These environmental contexts should be researched as possible causes for paralysis of battlefield leadership. In the meantime, senior leaders should begin adapting to the asymmetrical warfare by understanding the depth and complexity of challenges facing small unit leaders and educating them on individual and collective subjects (e.g. media relations, cultural awareness, and the human element of war fighting) (Liddy, 2002).

Also, the Marine Corps must begin to study the archetypical characteristics of men and women currently joining the Corps. Retired Marine veteran recently commented on how Marines

of current engagements and those of the Vietnam War think about conflicts and the profession of being Marines.

Marines embrace the warrior archetype more than other branches. The shadow of this is patriarchy, misogyny, and brutality. We are trained to be killing machines, deadening all emotion except anger. We're told we don't have the luxury of sensitivity, so we objectify everything (Russ, 2017) (as cited by Parker, 2017).

In contrast to criticismof thevisiblyout-of-date thinking about being a Marine in today's society. Service members complaints of a structure too rigid for career advancement at some military institutions, such as West Point, haveaccelerated military changes from the Department Defense. Who, currently plan to restructure the system for promotion and agreeto a more flexible recruiting structure forofficer allocations and promotions (Lilley, 2016).

With half of the current U.S. Marine Corps active force from the millennialgeneration(Lilley, 2016). The Corps' ability to create effective leaders must start at understanding those who look to join in a period that may not conveniently fit into the ethos and characterized demands of the Corps' "Old Guard."

The complex and hybrid environments, e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to the resourcefulness of newer, generational, leaders in unconventional battle situations (National Research Council, 2012). Imaginative in creating on-the-spot strategies to lessen the effects of resource gaps. The current small unit leader is encouraging higher echelon leaders to look to their experience as informed decision makers specifically, in asymmetrical leadership situations. The unit leader uses his or her decision-making to influence senior leaders and to inspire junior subordinates.

The United States Army has released its Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process* that characterizes the attitude shift to developing flexible leaders in design making. The intent is to educate leaders who can unconventionally think and can recognize the complexity of a problem before seeking its solution (Cojocar, 2011). Understanding complex problems within an assumed context will allow leaders to cognitively take part in the visualization, understanding, decision, and direction phases of the unit leader responsibilities.

To this end, Roth well (2010) investigated leadership readiness versus the potential for leadership to differentiate between individuals with future leadership potential and those ready to lead. This interpretation of the formulation of one's ability or potential to lead is also dependent on supporting dynamics, such as the genetics of nature in preparing a leader for the refinement of the nurturing process. To capitalize on the leadership readiness, the Marine Corps' Training and Education Command (TECOM) has established the Small Unit Decision Making (SUDM)(Brown, et al., 2012)program that focuses on the leader's cognitive capacity for sense making, adaptability, problem-solving, metacognition, and attention control. The initiative will improve the skill level of small unit leaders across the Marine Air Ground Task Force MAGTF and prepare leaders with the abilities to evaluate, determine, and perform while deployed in a dispersed environment (Brown, et al., 2012). Training and Education Command administrators are converting instructional procedures into tangible forms (e.g., prepared handbooks and instructor development discussions).

Collins (2001), famously stated, "Leaders of companies that go from good to great start not with 'where' but with 'who.' They start by getting the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats. They stick with that discipline—first

the people, then the direction—no matter how dire the circumstances." The SUDM initiative is, superficially, the Marine Corps' "bus" of creating and keeping great leaders.

IV Characteristics of Leadership

Michael Maccoby (1981) (as cited in Clawson, 2006) approached leadership with what he saw was the four character traits of leadership: *craft, enterprise, career,* and *self.* Within each trait, Maccoby found that a leader's role orientation carried positive and negative effects. First, a leader's craft positively reflects his or her as traditionally oriented to independent thinking, hardworking, and skilled. Alternatively, the negative display of the craft trait shows his or her propensity to become inflexible and suspicious. This suspicion has become expectedly pervasive throughout the military between lower Marines and senior leaders.

A survey conducted by the U.S. Army found that participants believed destructive leaders are focused on visible short-term mission objectives and are indifferent about, or ignorant to, troop morale. The majority of subordinates see this current craft style of leadership as arrogant, self-serving, and inflexible. Military leaders are in a unique position to be close to their subordinates, and yet they may be the last to detect their flawed crafted behavior (Reed, 2004).

Second, the enterprising leader displays positive characteristics of daring and entrepreneurial prowess toward their work and organization, whereas negatively he or she can be instrumental, calculating, and uncaring. The Marine Corps holds Marines to a high standard of professional and personal conduct. However, because of previous combat incidents involving Marines, this conduct has become the target of criticism by Marine insiders and detractors alike.

Third, Maccoby discusses how positively the career trait of a leader can reflect the professional and meritocratic life of a person. On the other hand, it can negatively subjugate a leader to bureaucracy and fearfulness. Whether it is faithfulness to the organization or fear of retaliation from senior leaders, most of what happens within an organizational [leadership] career are unknown to the public (Sun, 2009). It has not been lost in writing this paper how many reports of toxic leadership have come from the U.S. Army and not the Marine Corps; therefore, casting doubt if the Corps, is in fact, having a leadership crisis. However, this very veil of secret internal discrimination and intimidation lends to Maccoby's justification of why the career trait is important.

Finally, self is a leadership characteristic that when positively identified with can propel a leader to become experimental and self-developing. However, when negatively associated with it can impede a leader into escapist roles and rebellious behaviors. Most recently, the Corps has navigated through accusations of senior leaders scape goating juniors for monumental issues that they too were a part of in their lack of understanding leadership control within the Marines. A notable case, a former senior commander of the Corps stating his office would, "crush...the Marines responsible" (deGrandpre, 2015).

V Leadership Realignment

Leadership is about coping with change that begins with establishing a direction and aligning individuals to a successful outcome. The successful development of an organization's strategy depends on the growth and maturity of its leaders at all levels. Leaders must be able to balance the demanding requirements of the organization while providing for subordinates (McCausland, 2008).

Although there are numerous civilian and military articles, publications, and books on leadership. The United States Marine Corps continues to develop modern leadership theories and practices. Leadership and individual actions are what separate leaders and followers in the Marine Corps from counterparts in other organizations. The military develops and implements continuous professional military education (PME) courses and schools that instruct Marines from the lowest level to the highest rank of leadership. All Marines at some point in their career will assume the role as leader. Therefore, from commissioned officer to junior enlisted, every rank from Private to General is educated in various forms of military accepted leadership.

Given the growth of the United States' defense budget since 9/11 (McCausland, 2008). Leaders have begun to stretch thin their knowledge and interpretation of what has become acceptable leadership versus what was once the only form of leadership. Current global and sociopolitical situations have shaped military leaders to become experts in national influence, planning, coordination, guidance, and decision-making (Liddy, 2002). Even as leadership is a core competency of every Marine, contemporary challenges in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted critical sociocultural knowledge gaps in leader development (Laurence, 2011). The ensuing discussion highlights key leadership considerations for Marines, as they are required to make decisions in the face of irregular, asymmetric, and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Today, Marine leaders face overwhelming instability, doubt, complexity, and ambiguity, more so than his or hers civilian counterparts. The complex characterization of a Marine leader's ability to lead and make decisions demands an understanding of his or her ability to lead, follow, and critically think and execute. Circumstances facing small unit leaders in current conflicts require that leaders are given the flexibility in his or hers assigned area while synchronizing their actions with strategic objectives (Szepesy, 2005).

Goleman (2004) discovered that although the traditionally associated qualities of leadership, e.g., resolve, strength, intelligence, and imagination, are necessary for success; they are not enough to create a holistic leader. Ultimately, effective leaders distinguish themselves with a high level of emotional intelligence that includes self-awareness, motivation, empathy, self-control, and a greater use of social skills. Furthermore, Goleman established that leaders with high emotional intelligence scores may positively influence his or hers organizations performance and that emotional intelligence is twice as important as technical and IQ abilities.

Although overall intelligence among commanders is necessary, they must communicate clearly their commanders-intent to subordinates. Retired Lieutenant General Holder argued, "That an over-reliance on a rigid, methodical planning process and the relatively new doctrinal addition of commander's intent had left...some subordinates without a clear understanding of the operation" (Chavous & Dempsey, 2013). Regardless of the intelligence model used, leaders must earn the trust and confidence of their subordinates to accomplish any mission within the parameters of not only the organization's principles and traits of leadership but their clearly defined intent.

Over the past decade of war, an internal struggle between what the definition of a leader and the understanding of a manager has risen amongst the ranks. According to a U.S. Army informal poll that asked, "Leader or Manager." Many of the respondents explained that the military leads troops and manages things (U.S. Army Company Commanders, 2011).

With a necessary break from the traditional military explanation of leadership and with Marine leaders considering a re-direction in leadership training and implementation; there must be a redefining of Marine Corps leadership that addresses the individual perceptions of what it means to lead. Leadership is how the Corps exercises its full range of international power and it should keep pace with not only the changing socio, political, and economic climate, but with more subtleties of militarism, such as emotional intelligence.

VI Dimensional Threats Facing U.S. Marines

a. Definition. Currently, conflicts around the globe have become politically, socially, and physically complicated. Conflicts over land – as observed between Span and the United Kingdom with Gibraltar, governmental destabilization in Yemen and Venezuela, human atrocities in Syria and Africa, and impoverished states in India and Burma have blurred the lines of conflict containment.

Conflicts are no longer restricted to a region, religion, or state. Cross-border conflicts are happening more frequently and are leading to threats that are more unstable. The United States, in particular, can no longer depend on the security of distance between major warring states and its home shores. Through the advent of technology and an increase in the radicalization of ideologies, there is a clear and present threat to the United States, and her allies, from enemies near and far.

b. Structures and Similarities. The challenges faced by U.S. Marines today are unprecedented. Marines have to face threats in the conventional environments of war (land, sea, and air, aerospace) while, more recently, engaging in cyberspace and mind manipulation clashes. These threats are similar in that the enemy commits forces with the intent of dislodging their adversary either physically or through what has become recently popular, through the court of social media opinion. The military has termed this current type of unconventional warfare as asymmetrical. In understanding the structures of current threat dimensions challenging U.S. Marines, asymmetrical warfare must become implicit to all Marine leaders.

Asymmetrical warfare originally suggests a conflict between adversaries where military might and significance differ. However, contemporary military academics have broadened this definition to include dissimilar battlefield tactics and strategies between opposing forces. The recent hit-and-run tactics of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated an opponent's ability to think unconventionally from their adversary. Familiarity with their enemy's conventional tactics, their ability to disguise themselves amongst the civilian population, and being able to pick and choose the time and place of a battle are tactics and strategies used to offset the balance of the opposing force.

The four-dimensional threats facing Marines today are almost predictable. The Marine Corps has been engaged in land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 and have dominated the traditional battlefield with superior personnel (1,400,000), artillery pieces (1,299), tanks (8,848), aircraft (13,444), and ships (415). Even though, currently, the United States is ranked first among 126 other nations in current military capabilities (GFP, 2016). The early stage of the Iraq war, 2003, was the only time when this conventionality of warfare was effective; thus, giving way to increasing unconventional threats of cyber warfare and mind manipulation.

As early as 2009, it was assumed that only criminals used cyber-hacking (warfare) for nefarious purposes. Unlike conventional warfare where the U.S. fielded over 8,000 tanks against Iraq's 297during the second Gulf War. Current battles are fought from the homes and desktops of new age "cyber warriors." Most famous of attacks against a conventional superpower, the

United States, was from a single individual, Edward Snowden. Arguably, Edward Snowden hastened in an era where warfare went digital and where warriors needed to be less hardware and more software.

The final dimension of the conflict is mind manipulation. Today the news outlets, online sites, and social media are manipulating mass hysteria in an unprecedented way. Race-phobias, sexual-phobias, religious-phobias, and cultural phobias are all products of what the public sees and are manipulated by. News can no long be trusted, for it is now looked at as 'fake news' and social media sites are being accused of fixing the subconscious of their users by implementing subtle propaganda on their websites in order to gain a particular outcome.

The dimensions of warfare are continually fluctuating, and as such, military thinkers and planners must adapt. The ideology that two mutually accepting forces will conduct a war on an even battlefield is naïve. U.S. Marines are no longer fighting uniformed soldiers allied to a country, but to uninformed individuals allied it an idea.

VII Toxic Leadership

a. Definition. As defined by Reed (2012), along with other scholars, a 'toxic leader' is a leader one who exhibits two distinct personality characteristics: (1) an outward lack of sympathy or empathy for the welfare of others, as observed by subordinates; and, (2) an interactive approach that creates a culture of mistrust and hostility (Reed, 2004).

The toxic military leader uses his commitment in accomplishing mission requirements by functioning at the low estrange of obligation to his or her troops. Although this may result in an effective mission, it ignores the continuum model of leadership. It is this current toxicity of negative leaders that undermine the structure of the leadership connection between themselves and their subordinates; thus, destabilization unit morale, degrading subordinate motivation, creativity, and individual initiative.

b. Consequences. In an article entitled "How the U.S. Marines Encourage Service-Based Leadership" Lynch and Morgan (2017) cite a Gallup poll of 70% of workforce respondents who feel either "actively disengaged" or "not engaged." Contrary to this, it is reported that the U.S. Marine Corps uses a *service-based leadership* approach that prioritizes the organization's needs before that of the individual. Although there is some truth to Marine leaders eating last amongst their troops and never going to sleep before their men. The idea that action-based leadership is ubiquitous within Marine leaders is false.

Such dissent between Marine leaders and their subordinates can be witnessed by a large number of followers on social media pages such as *terminal lance*, *dysfunctional veterans*, *veterans brotherhood*, *Pg 11*, and the more recently controversial *Marines United*. These websites bring to light the arrogant way in which Marine leaders assume they have credulous obedience, authority, and leadership over their subordinates.

To very few junior Marines, the problem of toxic leadership is not surprising. It is estimated that for every ten soldiers, two are suffering from toxic leadership. What is surprising is how the U.S. military has been unaware of the degenerative effects toxic leadership has had on troop morale and good order and discipline. The consequences of mismanaged leadership remained unnoticed until an investigation of unusually high suicide rates exposed toxic leadership as a contributing factor. Although suicide is a personal act at which the military

cannot take full responsibility. The choice to end one's life has been exacerbated by the lack of empathic leadership shown to subordinates from military leaders. It can now be argued that U.S. casualties from toxic leadership rival casualties incurred in combat.

According to George Reed (2004) (as cited by Vergun, 2015), the consequence of toxic leadership is a 48% decrease in work effort followed by a 38% decrease in work quality. Early in the war on terrorism, no one in the military was talking about toxic leadership or how its effects would be felt a Marine generation later. Incidents such as a 2012 video showing U.S. Marine infantry urinating on dead Taliban fighters or the current social media scandal involving active and former Marines have led military insiders to question how they missed the current leadership conundrum.

Do these actions by subordinates indicate a loss of control by senior leaders, the lack of emotional intelligence, or the objective convictions needed to exercise good leadership? Assuming that perception is the reality, a synopsis of the current disenchantment by junior Marines would be telling on the real-time health of Marine Corps leadership.

In spite of this evidence, the U.S. Marine Corps will not openly substantiate the existence of a leadership problem and continues to maintain an appearance that there are no significant improprieties within its leadership. As an alternative, the Marines maintain that good leadership can be weighed by how many professional military courses a Marine leader has attended, how fast he or she can run 3-miles, how many tattoos he or she has, or how much he or she weighs. Such hubristic actions in failing to comprehensively evaluate the worth of leadership growth amongst its leaders and their effectiveness in leading are perpetual to toxic leadership.

Within the U.S. Marine Corps, leadership is communicated by mission accomplishment first and troop welfare second. Leadership in the mission is to train Marines to the standard of the military. However, what is omitted is any understanding of empathy toward the individual Marine. Troop welfare becomes a secondary footnote in the repertoire of many leaders.

Imposed Marine Corps linear priorities highlight mission accomplishment over other leadership capabilities and experiences, such as morale. Although there are no shortages of military leadership publications, journals, and courses on military leadership, mission accomplishment is still the apex of what makes a good Marine Corps leader.

Leaders are still leading troops underdeveloped, and ill prepared to balance leadership and the welfare of their troops simultaneously. The apparent practice of comprehensive leadership is absent from even the basic of Marine leaders. In its place is a determined focus on accomplishing the mission, often at the expense of the Marines and the overall morale health of the organization. Consequently, juniors become cynical of all Marine leaders, which trigger a leadership crisis. Additional research is needed to reinforce this paper as well as to answer the question "What can be done to prevent this cycle from continuing?"

The circumstances that have led to the U.S. Marine Corps being ambushed by the challenges of toxic leadership are difficult to explain, especially when it is inescapable to everyone but the leaders themselves. Nevertheless, whatever assumptions the Marines use to explain their leadership ethos to subordinates. They are regarded as lip service and are rendered invisible beyond mission accomplishment over troop welfare. In context to this review, Einstein theorized that simultaneous events between two observers might be viewed differently. Thus, peering through the pragmatic approaches to Marine Corps leadership from the viewpoints of Marines suffering under toxic leadership, that which is invisible to one observer [leaders] comes into focus to the rest [led].

VII Conclusion

Although attempting to formulate or conceptualize the idiosyncrasies of good leadership in a dozen pages is not practical. The fact of the matter is the quiet truths about Marine Corps leadership are the ones that allow us to rest easy at night. However, if the Marine Corps is genuinely an institution that America does not necessarily need, but one that it wants, then all Marines must become conscious that the internal leadership gaps troubling the Corps have second and third order effects of weakening the trust and confidence placed in them [the Marines].

Classifying societal problems as limited impacts to what many leaders may see as core values that are impervious to outside influences is arrogant. Current leadership trends have become an organizational failure that demands decisive solutions from all grades (McKenna, 2014). Therefore, current leaders must take up the responsibility of rebuilding the standards of leadership that the American public expects of their Marine Corps. A genuine answer to Marine leadership is not necessarily the ability to influence others or through a popular culture catch phrase. If we must make the impression of leadership easy for newer Marines to understand, there can be no better expression than "adaptable."

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